Chapter 4: The Problem of Evil (Part 2)

Walking with God through Pain & Suffering

by Tim Keller

 

Chapter 4: The Problem of Evil (Part 2)

 

Review

• The Problem of Evil in Context
  • Secularism as a set of beliefs
• The Argument(s) against God from Evil
  • Logical and Evidential Arguments
• “Soul-Making” and Suffering
  • Theodicy of “soul-formation”
• God, Freedom and Evil
  • Theodicy of “free will”
• The Problem with all Theodicies
  • Too ambitious; a “defense” is better

 

The Logical Argument and the “Noseeums” Objection

• The classic logical argument:
  • A truly good God would not want evil to exist; an all-powerful God would not allow evil to exist.
  • Evil exists.
  • Therefore, a God who is both good and powerful cannot exist.
• This argument has a hidden premise:
  • God could not possibly have any good reasons for allowing evil and suffering to exist.
• Is it possible that God could have reasons for allowing evil to exist that, in his mind, outweigh the desirability of the non-existence of evil?
• Is it possible that in our finite, human, limited understanding, we cannot possibly know what God’s reasons might be for allowing evil?
• If God has good reasons for allowing suffering and evil, then there is no contradiction between his existence and that of evil.
• If God is infinitely knowledgeable—why couldn’t he have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil that you can’t think of?
• If you have a God infinite and powerful enough for you to be angry at for allowing evil, then you must at the same time have a God infinite enough to have sufficient reasons for allowing that evil.
• The belief—that because we cannot think of something, God cannot think of it either—is a mark of great pride and faith in one’s own mind.

 

The Evidential Argument and the Butterfly Effect

• The logical argument from the problem of evil says God cannot possibly exist. The evidential argument says that evil and suffering simply make God’s existence improbable.
• The problem is that this evidential argument suffers from the same limitations and logical fallacies as the logical argument.
• It rests on the same premises and has the same Achilles heel.
• If we are unable to prove that God has no morally sufficient reasons for evil, we are certainly unable to assess the level of probability that he has such reasons.
• To insist that we have a sufficient vantage point from which to evaluate percentages or likelihood is to again forget our knowledge limitations.
• If there is an infinite God and we are finite, there would be no way for us to lay odds on such things.
• The intricacies of the universe and the virtually infinite possibilities within it make it inconceivable that we as human beings could state with any confidence what the likelihood or probability of the existence of God would be.
• The “butterfly effect” is the idea that even the most miniscule of events can have ripple effects throughout history that are unknowable and incalculable.
• If we cannot accurately calculate the effects of a butterfly’s flight path or the roll of a ball down a hill, how do we think we can accurately assess the future effects of something more complex and sorrowful, such as the death of a young child?
• If an all-powerful and all-wise God were directing all of history with its infinite number of interactive events toward good ends, it would be folly to think we could look at any particular occurrence and understand a millionth of what it will bring about.
• Only an omniscient mind could grasp the complexities of directing a world of free creatures toward previsioned good goals.
• Many evils and sorrows seem pointless and unnecessary to us—but we are simply not in a position to know or to judge.

 

The Visceral Argument from Evil

• The logical and evidential argument arises from intellectual thought, but the visceral argument arises from meeting sorrow and hardship in real life.
• Most people who, in the face of real evil, object to God’s existence do so not for philosophical reasons but for visceral ones.
• This distinguishes between the global problem of evil and the local problem of evil. The local problem of evil is the one that involves my life and those close to me.
• The experience of real evil and suffering can make the existence of God seem implausible, unreal to the heart.
• There is an emotional side to it, but there is also an inherent moral logic to the visceral reaction to evil.
• The visceral reaction causes moral outrage to arise without our hearts and our thoughts.
• The failure of the visceral argument against God is that not all react the same way to great evil. Some turn from God in the face of great evil, but others come out with their faith intact and even strengthened.
• In Nazi death camps, many lost hope and their faith, but many also found faith in such circumstances.
• The Christian hope of the resurrection and the renewal of the world enables us to view the present power of death in terms of its empty future and therefore in the knowledge of its sure defeat.

 

The Boomerang Effect

• Not everyone who experiences radical evil automatically loses faith in God.
• The visceral reaction to suffering has within it some arguments, some assumptions, that may not be conscious at first.
• The visceral response to suffering is not just a response. We are telling ourselves something about it; we are interpreting it in a particular way.
• There is a moral assumption in the minds and hearts of those who find suffering weakening their faith rather than strengthening it.
• The assumption is that God, if he exists, has failed to do the right thing, that he has violated some moral standard.
• It is an argument against God from the standpoint of a moral judgment.
• But this moral outrage against God creates a conundrum for the skeptic who disbelieves in God.
• A moral feeling means I feel some behavior is right and some behavior wrong and even repulsive.
• But, if there is no God, where do such strong moral instincts and feelings come from?
• Evolution cannot explain the feeling that all humans have of moral obligation and “rightness.”
• If there is no God, on what basis do you say to someone, “What you have done is evil,” if their sense of morality differs from yours? Why should your moral feelings take precedence over theirs?
• This is a conundrum because the very basis for disbelief in God—a certainty about evil and the moral obligation not to commit it—dissolves if there truly is no God. The ground on which you make your objection vanishes under your feet.
• The visceral argument against evil, the moral outrage we feel, has a boomerang effect. Our feeling of moral outrage assumes something (objective morality) that cannot exist if there is no God.
• In being upset with God about evil, you are relying on God (and his morality) to make an argument against God.
• The awareness of moral evil in the world is actually an argument for the existence of God, not against it.
• Unless we allow ultimate reality to be moral, we cannot morally condemn it.
• We cannot assume a morality on which to judge God unless God and his morality exist.
• If you think there really is such a thing as horrifying wickedness, then you have a powerful argument for the reality of God.
• You can’t even talk about “justice” without standing inside a theistic framework, that is, an implicit acknowledgement of God’s reality.
• To talk about justice, you have to talk about objective morality, and to talk about objective morality, you have to talk about God.
• The problem of senseless suffering does not go away if you abandon belief in God. Instead, abandoning the faith removes many resources for facing suffering.